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Abstract 
 
Summer pastures are underused while winter pastures are overused in Albania. 
Summer pastures are usually located a few kilometres from the village, while winter 
pastures are found very close to it. The grass growth in the villages is very low during 
the hot, dry summers, why farmers have traditionally moved their animals during this 
season. They have moved them to winter pastures in the mountains, where the 
temperature is lower. This habit is believed to have declined since democratization in the 
early 1990s.   
 
This paper presents a case study in North-Eastern Albania, where pasture use was 
studied. The aim of the study was to find out, in an economic framework, why pasture 
use is so uneven, if more intense use of summer pastures can help the overused winter 
pastures, which are degrading and how this would affect farmers’ economy. The focus 
of this work is pastures, but some attention is also given to forest management and the 
agricultural system in general.  
 
Pobreg is a village of slightly more than 1000 inhabitants. A “Natural Recourse 
Development Program” (NRDP)  is currently implemented, with the objective of 
improving the natural resources and decreasing poverty. Sida and the World Bank are 
co-financing the project.   
 
Field work was carried through in June and July 2008. A multi-perspective approach 
was undertaken. Information was gathered through interviews, focus group meetings, 
archival records, documentation and own observation.   
 
Information was gathered about pasture and forest management as well as the 
agricultural system.  
 
The main finding was that summer pasture use has declined since democratization in 
1991, and that the main reason is that it is not feasible to use the rangelands far away 
from the village with the few heads of animals that farmers hold after the reform.  
 
Five cows (or a corresponding herd of other animals) are needed for the investments 
needed to use summer pastures to be profitable. Many farmers hold fewer animals than 
that, so cooperation among farmers is suggested as a way to making summer pasture use 
possible. This would likely improve the status of both winter and summer pastures, the 
latter because biodiversity decreases when pastures are not properly grazed of 
maintained. Also important, animals’ growth and yields are believed to increase as they 
are brought to the mountains during summer.  
 
The main conclusion of the study is that summer pastures should be regarded an 
important resource and that they should be included in the on-going projects that aim to 
improve natural resources and decrease poverty. The interviews revealed that the 
NRDP was seen as very creditable, and they should hence be a trust-worthy third part in 
a potential cooperation.  
 
 
 
Key terms: Albania, Natural resource use, summer pastures, overgrazing, household economy 
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Sammanfattning  
 
Sommarbeten, belägna någon eller några kilometer från byarna, är underutnyttjade i 
Albanien medan vinterbeten överutnyttjas med ogräsdominans och erosion som följd. 
Vinterbeten ligger i allmänhet i direkt anslutning eller mycket nära byarna. Under den 
varma sommaren växer gräset på vinterbetena väldigt lite, vilket gör att man 
traditionellt flyttat djuren till sommarbeten i bergen där klimatet är annorlunda. Det 
verkar dock som om detta har förändrats sedan demokratiseringen i början av 1990-
talet. Fenomenet har studerats i en fallstudie i byn Pobreg i nordöstra Albanien.  
 
Pobreg är en by med drygt 1000 invånare. Många är mycket fattiga. Sedan några år 
tillbaka genomförs ”Natural Resource Development Project” (NRDP) i byn. Projektet 
syftar till att minska fattigdomen och förbättra naturresurserna. Bland andra Sida och 
Världsbanken finansierar projektet.  
 
Studiens syfte var att utröna varför användandet är så ojämnt, och huruvida ett ökat 
användande av sommarbeten under sommaren kan minska degraderingen av 
vinterbeten och vilka ekonomiska konsekvenser som skulle följa på det.  
 
Fältarbete genomfördes i byn Pobreg under juni och juli 2008. En multiperspektiviell 
ansats användes. Information samlades in genom intervjuer, fokusgrupper, arkivdata, 
dokumentation och egna observationer.  Information om skogens, betenas och 
jordbruksproduktionen organisation samlades in.  
 
Det huvudsakliga resultatet var att nyttjandegraden till viss del beror på den 
jordbruksreform som genomfördes 1991. Jordbruksmarken delades upp i mycket små 
enheter (0,2 hektar per person på landsbygden). Pobregs bönder menade att det var 
omöjligt för dem att utnyttja sommarbetena, som kräver övernattningsmöjligheter för 
herdarna, med så få djur. Litteraturen pekar på att det även finns en ovilja att leva 
traditionellt liv. Detta fick dock inget stöd av den empiriska studien.  
 
Studien visade också att en produktion med fem kor (eller motsvarande värde av andra 
djur som kräver högkvalitativt bete) är nödvändig för att investeringar för att utnyttja 
sommarbeten ska vara lönsamma. I dagsläget har bönderna färre djur än så, och därför 
skulle ett samarbete mellan jordbrukare kunna initieras både för att minska 
överutnyttjandet av vinterbetena och öka utnyttjandet av sommarbeten. Sommarbetena 
i byn har nämligen stor biologisk mångfald. En annan fördel med sommarbetena är att 
djurens tillväxt och avkastning med stor sannolikhet gynnas.  
 
Studiens slutsats är därför att sommarbetena bör ses som en resurs och att man bör 
äverväga att inkludera dem i de policies som pågår och som syftar till att förbättra 
naturresurserna och minska fattigdomen. Intervjuerna visade att NRDP hade stort 
förtroende hos bönderna, och därför skulle projektet kunna fungera som en tredje part i 
ett potentiellt samarbete mellan bönder.  
 
 
 
 
 
Nyckeord: Albanien, Naturresursanvändning, summarbeten, overbetning, husehållsekonomi 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Problem background 
 
Albania’s agrarian reform after the fall of communism resulted in radical structural changes in 
agricultural land. While most other post-communist countries in Europe auctioned land or 
allowed cooperatives to conduct agricultural production (Swinnen, J), Albania instead 
distributed the agricultural land to the rural population (Congu and Swinnen 1999, Lerman et 
al 2002, Swinnen 1999).  
 
The more productive parts of the country had relatively consolidated ownership prior to the 
communist rule and in these parts land was simply given to the actual users on a per capita 
basis (Congu and Swinnen 1999, Wheeler and Waite 2003). The arable land in the mountains 
in the east and in the north is less productive and ownership was less consolidated prior to 
communism. Here, attempts were made to give the land to the decedents of previous owners 
(De Waal 2004, Swinnen 1999).  
 
Attempts were made to give all rural families land that was of equival value, which resulted in 
fragmented land. Concerns have been raised in post-communist Albania that the 
fragmentation of agricultural parcels and farms in Albania has slowed down productivity 
growth (Lusho and Papa 1998, Sallaku and Shehu, World Bank report 2006, Wheeler and 
White 2003).  
 
Food shortages made Albania’s poor dependant on foreign aid in the late eighties and early 
nineties. The agrarian reform was naturally prioritized in the privatization of state-owned 
property (Congu and Swinnen 1999). Forests, pastures and other non-arable land have gained 
more attention over the past few years. A large fraction is still state-owned although the 
transfer of this land to local governmental level is on-going.  
 
Pastures and forests have degraded in many parts of Albania, which has led foreign 
development organizations as well as governmental agencies to take action to improve these 
lands. The Natural Resource Development Project (NRDP) is implemented by the Ministry of 
the Environment, Forestry and Water administration, and financed by the Government of 
Albania (GoA) the World Bank, Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the Swedish 
international development agency (Sida), has carried through various projects improving 
natural resources and their management in 218 communes in Albania. The NRDP has 
employed many of the poor in the country through the projects financed there.  
 
1.2 Problem  
 
The focus of this thesis is the economic aspects of the problem of overused winter pastures 
and underused summer pastures.  
 
As was pointed out by the Sida and World Bank mission of the summer 2008, winter pastures 
are in general heavily overused and create long-term problems for sustainability. The high 
animal pressure results in weed dominance and soil degradation. In turn, this leads to soil 
erosion. The mission pointed out the need for more accurate cost and benefit estimations to 
base future policy on (The Mission report, 2008).  
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The village of Pobreg is one of many sites where winter pastures have degraded and are at 
risk erosion during winters and springs. Although there are, according to local officials, by all 
means sufficient pasture surface to cover the needs of the villagers, winter pastures were 
heavily overused. Summer pastures were described by villagers and local officials as having 
free capacity. The situation is known to be common to key informants, although no attempts 
to claim that the study case is representative is made by the author. The mission report (2008) 
and Shundi (FAO homepage 1) pointed out that winter pastures are overused, while this 
problem does not seem to exist in summer pastures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Map over Albania. Albania is situated to the north and east of Greece, south of Serbia and 
Montenegro and west of Macedonia and Kosovo (not on map).  The study area is marked with an arrow. 
Source: lonely planet homepage 1.  
 
1.3 Objective of Study 
 
The broad aim of this study is to provide a basis for policy recommendations to address the 
problem of unsustainable use of pastures in Albania. The specific objective is to clarify the 
reasons overuse of winter pastures and underuse of summer pastures. To achieve this the 
study will address the following questions: 
 
• What are the reasons to the uneven use of resources?  
• How many cows are needed for the traditional mixed pasture system to be profitable?  
• Would a policy of moving grazing activities to underused summer pastures from 
overused winter pastures be recommended?  
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2. Method  
 
This chapter explains methods used in the field trip when data was gathered, and provides 
reflections on the choice and performance of them.  
 
2.1.1 Why a Case Study?  
 
Case studies are rare in the literature of agricultural economics. Case studies are commonly 
criticized for lacking reliability (see for example Tellis 1997) due to subjectivity and the 
absence of replication. The critique especially arises when results are extrapolated (Kennedy 
and Luzar 1999). Two methods have been used in this study to ensure reliability. They are the 
use of multiple sources of information (when possible) and that the draft case study was 
reviewed by key informants. 
 
The social sciences have three tasks; predicting, explaining and understanding. Kennedy and 
Luzar (1999) argued that the current strength in agricultural economics is prediction, and that 
case studies can compliment this strength by providing deeper understanding.  
 
The approach for the case study has been to be multi-perspectival in order to ensure that the 
whole picture is carefully studied. This includes the use of multiple sources of evidence. 
There are a number of sources that may be used in a case study. The ones listed by Tellis 
(1997) are documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation 
and physical artifacts. Documents, archival records, interviews and direct observation have 
been used in this study.    
 
A qualitative case study was carried through because the method was argued to fit the project 
objectives. Quantitative data is scarce and of low quality in Albania, and there it was not 
possible for the author to collect sufficient amounts of data to perform statistical analysis. 
Moreover, it was argued that the aim of the study was to understand rather than to perfectly 
quantify, why a qualitative case study was preferred.   
 
2.1.2 Field Procedures  
 
 
Field work was conducted during June and July 2008. Focus groups, survey interviews and 
deep interviews were conducted. Moreover, great attempts were made to read all written 
material that could be found on the site the help from the translator Fabjola Begaj.  
 
Upon arrival to Kukës, a village to study had to be chosen. The choice of the village was 
made upon the recommendation of Isuf Omuri, the Netherlands Development Organisation 
(SNV), Kukës. After discussions with several peers and colleges, Omuri recommended 
Pobreg. This particular village was found to be appropriate since it was typical for the area 
and since natural resources was managed both in common and in private rights to use.  
 
The survey questions were also asked in another village, where abandoned agricultural lands 
serve as pastures (although not classified as such). The results from this village, Tregtan, have 
not been used in this thesis since the problems the population of Tregtan faced was very 
different.  
  4 
 
 
 
The main sources of information were the Forest and Pasture Mangement plan (FPMP)1 
archival records (official statistics), interviews with villagers and focus group meetings and 
interviews with local officials.  
  
The management plan is a plan set up by the forest association upon meetings held in the 
villages. It contains information about the socio-economic conditions of the village, the 
species and natural resources in its surroundings. It states the aims and objectives for the kind 
of projects that should be prioritized in the NRDP implementation. This plan was used as 
source of information and as a background to the interviews. The official statistics that could 
be found was used to verify the information found in the management plan and to add data 
that was missing in the plan.  
 
The attempt for the selection of villagers was to get representative informants rather than 
randomly picked. Randomness was not preferred primarily because the deficiency of statistics 
of people living in the village; poor people may not even exist in population statistics. No less 
than four different guides were used in the field work to diminish the risk of a snowball effect. 
All guides were well aware the value of interviewing different types of villagers and did not 
know all the interviewees.      
 
A final set of questions were decided upon after two sets of pilot interviews. The pilot 
interviews showed with all desired clarity that some questions, that were initially chosen, 
were not applicable to this field. In particular, some of the more abstract questions of risk 
attitude and time preferences were found to be inappropriate. When faced with imagined 
investment options with differing expected outcome and risk characteristics, people would 
prefer the lower risk option. Then, they would add that they would work a little harder and get 
more money out of it. Moreover, informants did not fully agree with concept of investments. 
They understood that they would have to pay money initially, and that they did not have 
sufficient means for that, why the question did not make sense to them.  
 
Discussions with Isuf Omuri and Anila Aliaj, who both have long experience of interviewing 
the rural population of Kukës led to a final questionnaire. Many of the posed questions were 
closed but allowed for the respondents to talk freely. Most interviewees were happy to talk 
about the topics of the closed questions, and their comments and motivations were noted. The 
purpose of the questionnaire was never to use it for econometric studies but rather to allow the 
respondents to answer to questions that was simple enough for them to feel confident but led 
to interesting results and comments.  
 
18 villagers took the interview survey questionnaire. Of these, only six were women. This is 
unfortunate but might partly be explained by the difficulties of interviewing women – even as 
a woman. In the report on agricultural progress and development (Dekker, 2008) only 4 
interviewees out of 278 were female, something that might shed some light on these 
difficulties. The guides were all men, and one could argue that the presence of well-educated 
men, even if the guides kept some distance to the interview setting, influenced the women’s 
willingness to take the questionnaire. No attempts to convince women that did not want to 
participate were made. Another group that was particularly hard to meet was people engaged 
in off-farm working activities. These were, naturally, working during the day and the cultural 
                                                        
1
 The formulation of FPMP is a key activity in NRDP. It is a participatory process where a consultant, funded by 
the NRDP, provides technical assistance and facilitates the villages and user association to demarcate the 
boundaries and formulate the management of the forests and pastures,   
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codes complicated making interview during evenings. Only one person working outside the 
village could be found.  
 
Focus group meetings were arranged both with farmers and with local officials and experts. 
The focus latter group meetings were carried through for two reasons:  
1. To gain opinions to which villagers opinions could be compared with.  
2. To gather information on topics the farmers knew little about.  
 
The focus group meetings were initiated with the delivery of a paper on which the main issues 
to be discussed were listed. The Pobreg focus group contained 6 persons. The second focus 
group meeting were conducted in Kruma, and contained five persons (see bibliography for 
more information on informants).  
 
Additional deep interviews were held with villagers, forest engineers, agronomists, World 
Bank and SNV staff.    
 
The initial aim of the field trip was to investigate social effects of the on-going land reform 
where user rights to land have been distributed to villages, clans and families. During the 
interviews, people referred to their pastures as beautiful, good and very good. Having seen the 
poor pastures and heard about the experienced erosion problems, the author was puzzled. 
Later, it turned out that the pastures the farmers were talking about where the summer 
pastures and not the winter pastures where animals had been seen grazing.  
 
When the answers were analyzed it became clear that the most interesting feature in Pobreg 
was the use of summer and winter pastures. For that reason, most of the empirical material 
gathered has not been used in this thesis. 
 
3 The Case Study  
 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the economic problem of pasture management and use by 
describing the case. The case is the use of summer and winter pastures in the Pobreg village. 
Thereafter, the main findings are presented. The attempt has been to provide a deep and 
holistic picture of the village. The agro-pastoral system of the village connects agricultural 
land, pastures and forests closely why all three are given some attention here.   
 
3.1 Study Site Description 
The study village, Pobreg, is located in the province of Kukës in Northern Albania, bordering 
Kosovo. The area is mountainous and has little arable land with low productivity. The coldest 
month is February, when the average temperature drops to -3.2 degrees Celsius, and the 
warmest is July with an average temperature of 21.9 degrees Celsius. The rainiest months are 
October, November and May. The arable land amounts to 21 hectare in total, and 0.02 
hectares per capita (Therthore Management Plan).  
 
The total population of Pobreg is 1042 inhabitants, with slightly more men than women. 210 
persons are reported to be in working age and conditions. The income per day and capita is 
0.23 $US (see table 1) which is far below the extreme poverty line of $US 1 per day and 
capita (UN homepage 1). It is plausible that some of the values produced in the village such 
as milk and meat are not included in the measure, why the estimate is not perfectly 
comparable with the UN measure.  
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Table 1. Income statistics. Own calculations based on the management plan.   
Average income statistics ($US)  
Income per family and year 800 
Persons per family 9,4 
Income per person and year 85,2 
Income per person and day 0,2 
  
 
According to the management plan2 of the village, there are 516 sheep, 363 goats, 434 cattle, 
49 pack animals (horses, donkeys and mules) and 1236 poultry. The domestic animals are 
given some course feed (usually maize) but forests and pastures remain important sources of 
energy (management plan). Cows, being the highest valued animals (management plan, own 
observation), are fed with maize throughout the whole year with some 50 kilograms maize 
over one month (personal communication, villagers).  
 
3.1 An Institutional Perspective of the Village   
 
This chapter aims to put the village and its use of pastures and other natural resources in a 
historical and contemporary context. Data gathered during the case study are presented 
along with findings from the literature.  
 
3.1.1 Pre-communism  
 
The land tenure under the Ottoman Empire was characterized by a few large land-owners 
combined with many small or medium sized land-holdings. Peasants were obliged to help 
private landlords, religious institutions or the state with agricultural inputs like labor when 
demand for this was high.  
 
Albania’s independence in from the Ottoman Empire in 1912 involved little change of this 
system. Land ownerships were very unequally distributed and a few families held control over 
much of the land. 3% of the population owned 27% percent of the land at this time. These 
landowners were operating on the most productive land, while land was less consolidated in 
the un-productive northern and eastern parts of the country (Congu and Swinnen 1999, 
Wheeler and White 2003).  
 
According to one of the older men in Pobreg, all families had cottages in the mountains close 
to the summer pastures before communism. Half of the family went to live in the mountains 
with the animals and the other half stayed in the village to grow crops and vegetables 
(Interview, man, 65, 8 July 2008).  
 
Before the communist shift in 1944 all Pobreg’s pastures and 95 percent of its forests were 
common property.  The common property was used by the village population, and the private 
only by the families that owned it. There was no governmental property of this kind, 
something that would dramatically change with the communist rule in 1944, which later 
resulted in that all property was put in the hands of the state.  
 
                                                        
2
 The management plan was set up by the village forest association, supported by SNV staff and NRDP trainers 
in order to plan future natural resource related activities such as management and investments.  
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3.1.2 Communism 
 
 Communism eventually resulted in the reorganization of agricultural production to large 
collective farms. Only a small-sized plot was allowed for private use. The cooperative farm in 
Pobreg was in large run by women since a large fraction of the men were engaged in off-farm 
activities such as the near-by cupper factory.  
 
The agrarian reform of 1945 redistributed the land previously owned by merchants, artisans 
and religious institutions (i.e. the largest landowners) to poor farmers that were landless prior 
to the reorganization (Lusho and Papa 1998). As time passed, land was transformed to 
become state-owned. The most productive land was collectivized first, and the least later. In 
1976 only 0.5 percent of agricultural land was in private use (Congu and Swinnen 1999). 
Albanian law defined all land as state-owned with the majority in the cooperative farming 
sector and the rest in the state sector (Lusho and Papa 1998).  
   
Food shortages and other economical problems during the 1980: s resulted in some 
liberalization through the “New Economic Mechanism”, through which families where 
allowed to keep 0.1-0.3 hectares of agricultural land and one cow or ten heads of sheep or 
goats. The reform was carried through without any real legal basis and did not result in any 
improved productivity in the collective farms. By 1990-1991 Albania’s population depended 
on foreign food aid. (Congu and Swinnen 1999).  Illegal and legal logging resulted in major 
deforestation in the commune during the communist time (Terthore Management plan). 
 
Communism included loss of arable and forest land for the Pobreg population. The village 
lost 200 hectares of arable land due to the redirection lake Fierza, which’ hydro-power 
stations provide most of Albania with electricity. This land is today formally owned by 
descendents of previous owners, but can of course not be ploughed or harvested. Near-by 
cupper extraction and refinement activities caused severe environmental degradation and 
deforestation (See picture 4 on page 19). The main problem is the sulfur dioxide pollution that 
made a large fraction of the land close to the village unproductive. Liming would be an option 
but no such plans have been made due to the high costs related to this activity. The state 
subsidized the Pobreg collective farm for the economic losses these activities generated, but 
no subsidies have been paid after democratization.  
 
The collective farm in Pobreg used the summer pastures throughout communism. New 
cottages were installed in which groups of men lived to care for the animals. All animals were 
kept there for the summer months. At the fall of communism, these cottages and most other 
previously state-owned properties were destroyed (Ferhat Hallaci). 
 
3.1.3 Post-communism 
 
The food situation was difficult in Albania at the time of privatization, why agrarian reforms 
were put high on the political agenda. When many other former communist countries chose to 
redistribute land to pre-communist owners or sell it, the Tirana parliament focused on 
distributing land to the actual users, i.e. the rural population (Congu and Swinnen 1999, 
Lerman et al 2002, Swinnen 1999). Albania was the only transitional country outside the 
Soviet Union that switched from exclusive state ownership to private (Lerman et al 2002), 
which might have facilitated the “radical” agrarian reform (Congu and Swinnen 1999).    
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The property rights reform in Albania is not yet fully completed, and the system has caused 
confusion and conflicts. Land and property conflicts are common and it is estimated that half 
of all cases in civil courts relate to these (World Bank Tirana report 2006). 
 
There seems to be three reasons to the confusion and disagreement over land. The first is 
weak agreement on what methods that should be used to achieve the goals of the reform 
(World Bank Tirana report 2006, Wheeler and White 2003).  
 
The second is the fact that there are different legal definitions for different categories of 
property. This has resulted in gaps and overlaps in the property right laws (World Bank 
Tirana report 2006). While the aim for arable land was that it would fall into the hands of its 
users, the aim for the property rights reform of pastures and forests is:  
- Small areas may transfer into private hands 
- Forests and pastures located close to villages remain in state ownership or communal 
ownership, where further decentralization may take place  
- Forests and pastures located far away from villages remain in state ownership and 
enterprises may gain the right to use from the government  
- Special protected areas remain in state control (World Bank Tirana report 2006). 
 
By May 2008 60 percent of forests and  pastures had been transferred from state to communal 
control. (Carl von Essen, personal communication, 2008) 
 
The third reason is fragmentation. Land fragmentation is defined as “noncontinous land 
parcels that are owned and tilled as a single enterprise” (Lusho and Papa 1998). Land division 
aimed to give each family plots that were equivalent in quality and type of land (cropland, 
olive groves, vineyards, orchards and vegetable gardens close to the house). Some families 
also retained ownership over land they had owned previously. Regards were taken both to 
distance and conditions such as the slope (Lusho and Papa).  
 
Many have agreed that the fragmentation of agricultural land slows down productivity growth 
in Albania (Lusho and Papa 1998, Sallaku and Shehu, World Bank report 2006, Wheeler and 
White 2003).  The agricultural land was operated by 420 enterprises with a field average of 36 
hectares before the reform. After, it was divided into 1.8 million parcels averaging of 0.25 
hectares (Wheeler and White 2003.) Congu and Swinnen (1999) agreed that this is a negative 
aspect of the reform, but add that the effects were limited given the low technology 
production and high labor transaction costs. Their conclusion was that “fragmentation may 
hamper future growth” (Congu and Swinnen 1999).  
 
The main goal of the redistribution of agrarian land was to give it to its actual users. Almost 
all agricultural land is today owned and operated by small individual family farms (Congu 
and Swinnen 1999). Ex-owners were meant to be compensated by other means such as coastal 
or urban land, something that has not been fully implemented (Wheeler and White 2003).  
 
This type of redistribution had legal support. Still, in the mountainous parts where Pobreg is 
situated it was commonly given to the old owners (De Waal, 2004, Swinnen, 1999). 
According to De Waal (2004) this was possible because the boundaries were well 
remembered (the mountainous regions were collectivized much later than the rest of the 
country), and because ownership over such a valuable resource as land was protected by the 
traditional law, the Kanun. The Kanun is the traditional law, were marriage rules and land 
rights are the corner stones. Land ownership is highly valued and borders over land are well 
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protected (De Waal 2004). Isuf Omuri, SNV Kukës explained the importance of the land 
rights by the words: “There are two things in life that can never be moved. They are bones in 
graves, and border stones”.3  
 
Identification of users was done as part of the participatory formulation of the communal 
forest and pasture management plan (FPMP).The oldest people in the village helped to 
identify these private owners, and the village borders marking the village’s commons. The 
identification of users was done by villagers with the help from forest technicians and the 
Kukës department of forest services. The loss of agricultural land caused by the redirection of 
Lake Fierza has complicated a situation that would probably have been difficult anyway. 
There are three bordering villages, of which there were no conflicts with two. There are 
natural borders to these two villages (the river in one case and the top of a mountain range in 
the other). The reestablishment of the borders to the third village, where natural borders were 
missing, included some disputes between the councils of the elderly. The borders were made 
legal in 2000 (Terthore Management plan).   
 
The work to transfer state owned forests to municipality in Therthore started in 2000. At the 
time of writing, the ownership right to pastures and forests was being transferred to the 
municipality. The right to use them belongs to the population of Pobreg.  
 
Pastures are traditionally in private or common use but have rarely been in private entitle in 
this region (Isuf Omuri). One informant told that the pastures were regarded as “holy”, and 
that such land should not be sold (Survey interview, 23 June 2008).  
 
Pobreg’s arable land situation is difficult with only 0.02 hectares per capita (only one tenth of 
the country per rural capita average). The loss of valuable land resources as a result of 
communist investments has changed the land ownership structure in the village. Having lost 
200 of the 221 hectares of arable land, the village relies more on common resources now than 
previously. There were ninety families in Pobreg prior to communism, of which thirty were 
small and net suppliers of labor to the sixty larger farms (Ferhat Hallaci). There are no large 
farms today, according to Hallaci, and specialization in crop or livestock production has 
declined. Instead, farmers are doing their best to support their families with both crops and 
animal products.  
 
Feminization of agriculture has followed communism primarily because international 
migration is male dominated (Mileka et al 2007). Salim XX stated that one of the major 
problems for Pobreg was feminization of agriculture, even though migration is rare. He 
claimed that the reason was the absence of men in agriculture during communism. They were 
engaged in off-farm activities at the cupper factory and elsewhere and have not returned to 
farm activities.  
 
3.1.4 Cooperation 
 
If fragmentation and small production sizes are problems for agricultural productivity, 
consolidation of land to bigger units should be a solution. Cooperative farming may utilize 
economies of scale, increase competitiveness and facilitate information exchange. 
Cooperative farming should not be confused with collective farming, where productivity is 
often decreased by moral hazard problem (Deininger 1995).  
                                                        
3
 Border stones are always three. One stone marks the borders and the other two witnesses the border. They 
represent the person who marked the border with two witnesses.  
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Land consolidation has been difficult due to administrational aspects. Allover Albania, 
abundant and refused land can be seen. The cost of transferring land is 8400 leke (68.96 Euro 
29 August 2008) and all parties have to be present at the time of the transfer (Sallaku and 
Shehu), which is problematic since there are many absent landlords working in urban areas or 
foreign countries.   
 
A minority of farmers has started to cooperate to avoid the negative aspects of fragmentation 
(Lusho and Papa 1998). This usually includes members from the same extended family, and 
productivity has proven to be higher when cooperating (ibid). Pilot projects carried through in 
2002-2003 showed that land consolidation (i.e. exchange of parcels) needed a trustworthy 
coordinator for farmers to encourage them that they would not be cheated (Sallaku and 
Shehu).  
 
During the focus group meeting in Kruma (5 July 2008) the matter of cooperation was 
brought up. Participants recalled that cooperation among villagers were not common, 
although it would be beneficial for the agricultural development. One participant expressed 
that “individualism is big here”.  
 
Another participant expressed that he had seen cooperation over pastures on a field trip to 
Italy, and added that it had worked and that everyone seemed to benefit from the cooperation. 
Another participant said that he had seen cooperation work in Kosovo, and that there was 
hence no reason that it could not work in Albania. They agreed that more cooperation would 
probably increase over time, as people understood that cooperation does not necessarily mean 
that someone benefits on the costs of someone else.  
 
A third participant told about one village, where cooperation had been initiated through a pilot 
project. The pilot project included cooperation between three brothers and three of their 
cousins. The group agreed that this would probably be the best way to initiate cooperation, 
since the rest of the village would then see with their own eyes that no one cheated. This 
particular pilot project had facilitated market market access, since the cost of bringing 
produce to the market was fairly constant and was now split among six persons.  
 
The survey results from Pobreg showed that cooperation with everyday tasks is common. The 
informants were asked if they cooperate with people from other households in their everyday 
work, and, if so, if this has been made harder or easier by the implementation of the NRDP. 
15 persons told that they did cooperate with other households in the management of forests 
and pastures. One worked only within the own household and two left no answer. Of the 16 
persons that answered to the question of wether or not the NRDP has facilitated this 
cooperation, 15 said it had. All informants claimed that education of children had been made 
easier through the NRDP, although this is not something that people cooperated with other 
households on.  
 
No one reported cooperation with banking/ financing or market transfers. It is worth noticing 
that only three respondents reported to sell anything on the market. The matter of cooperating 
with banking, financing and marker transfers was viewed with suspicion and the translator 
asked that the question should be removed from the survey questions because “people cannot 
respect a person asking such stupid things” (Personal Communication, Fabjola Begaj, June 
2008). This indicates that this type of cooperation is indeed rare. 
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Carl Fredrik von Essen (the World Bank, Tirana) expressed that cooperation is not yet 
popular among rural Albanians. His opinion is that people do not trust a cooperative system 
because of the bad experiences they had during communism. (Carl Fredrik von Essen, 
personal communication 14 July 2008).   
 
3.2 Agriculture  
 
3.2.1 Agricultural System and Conditions  
 
The agro-pastoral system combines crop and livestock production. The agricultural 
production in Pobreg is generally for subsistence farming, where farmers grow what they 
need regardless of market prices (see the model chapter for details). Of the 18 survey 
interviews conducted, only three reported that their household sold anything on the market. 
These three household sold less than 20%. Agriculture is a livestock-crop mixed system 
where livestock is an important source of energy and also serve as a safety net. Farmers know 
that animals can be sold in case of an urgent need of cash.  
 
Most small farms do not use the kind of crop rotation we see in the more developed parts of 
Europe. Commonly farmers plant hay seed in September and harvest in June. The same land 
is thereafter planted with either corn or wheat. This rotation is used year after year, although 
agricultural land might be let under fallow or as meadow to recover in the more mountainous 
parts. The farmers in Pobreg plant hay, corn, alfalfa, wheat and vegetables. Small vineyards 
and olive graves are kept by the wealthier farmers. Drying fans that were used during 
communism are not profitable to use for the single farmer. 
 
The average crop production in the area is 4-5 tons wheat per hectare, 4-5 tons corn per 
hectare and 1.5-2 tons oat per hectare in the district (Sefedin 2008). The interviewees reported 
smaller harvests (2-3 tons of wheat and corn). The average water content at harvest rarely 
exceeds 15% and seed is left to dry in the sun.  
 
Soils are red, light and slightly acid. Liming has not been performed since in the 1980: s.  The 
communist scale for soil productivity differs from the norm scale used by the FAO. This scale 
starts with most productive soils at 1 and least at 8. Soils in Kukës range from 5 to 7, with the 
most productive soils in the valleys bordering lakes and rivers. No attempts to estimate a 
nutrient response curve has been made since 1985. A recommended nutrient application is 
300 kg/ ha with 2-3-1 proportions (N-P-K4).  The largest problem for agricultural production 
in Probreg as well as the area is however not nutrient but water scarcity and irrigation systems 
used under communism are rarely used. Pobreg’s irrigational system’s pipes could still be 
used, but the pump was destroyed in 1991 and irrigation is for that reason not performed in 
the village.  
 
3.2.2 Livestock  
 
Cattle are popular domestic animals and the domestic, nameless breed produces some 1050 
kilograms per lactation on average (management plan). Some high producing breeds have 
been introduced, and in the semi-urban areas Jersey and Austrian mountain cows can be seen. 
These cows produce at most 3000 kilograms per lactation (livestock specialist), but the 
average production of foreign breeds in Pobreg is only 1400 kilograms. Cows live eight or 
                                                        
4
 Nitrogen- Phosphorus- Kalium  
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nine years before they are put down due to reduced productivity or fertility problems. Cows 
graze freely in rural and semi-urban areas. Hay and Alfa Alfa are important energy sources 
during winter. Foreign funding has helped to introduce artificial insemination. Sheep, goat 
and poultry are common animals. Sheep are of local breed Rube and Bardhore and goats are 
referred to as just goats.    
 
Livestock is important in the income and most all of the interviewed farmers had at least some 
animal (see chart 1). All informants had at least one cow. The average numbers of cow among 
the interviewees were 1.8 cows. Pack animals were also common and all except two had at 
least one. Cattle and goats were kept in larger herds.  
 
 
Chart 1. Number of livestock reported by villagers in Pobreg. The total number of respondents were 17.  
 
The survey in the village showed that 18 of 18 (100%) wanted more animals. They seemed 
surprised at the question as if it was absolutely obvious that they would want more animals. 
This was not the case in Tregtan, the other village where these questions were asked. Tregtan 
is richer, and has experienced substantial migration. The constraints to animal production in 
Pobreg are presented in chart 1. The most common constraint was the budget, which 
accounted for 50% of the first most important constraints. Only one person (a man of 24 
years) mentioned market access as a limit to animal production. Two persons chose pastures 
as the most limiting factor.  
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Chart 2. First and second most important constraints to why farmers cannot have more animals. The total 
numbers of respondents was 18.  
 
3.2.3 Constraints to Agricultural Production  
 
Informants were also asked to choose between a number of inputs and outputs to production 
(see chart 3). All 18 informants reported that they wanted some of the things they were asked 
to choose between. Cows were not given as an alternative, because it is widely known that 
cows are a sign of wealth, and cows were therefore assumed to be dominant. A few 
informants said that if they could have another cow, they would not need anything else. 
  
Nine of the eighteen respondents reported water as their first choice, three reported pastures 
and one reported manure/ fertilizer. In other words, 13 of 18 reported strict agricultural inputs 
as the alternatives that would give them the highest utility. The other five reported sheep 
(three) and goats (two). At the end of each interview, people were asked if they wanted to ask 
or add anything. All people that wanted to add something mentioned water as binding 
constraint. Many of these said that if they only had water, they would need nothing else; with 
water they could produce of the other things themselves.   
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Chart 3. Informants were asked to rank which of a number of production inputs and outputs  
that would increase utility the most. Half of the respondents choose water as their first choice.  
13 of 18 choose an input as the first choice, which indicates that there are (hard) binding constraints in 
their production. Cows were not included in the alternatives. The total number of informants was 18.  
 
3.3 Forests  
 
Albanian Forests are classified as high forests, firewood forests or brush-wood forests .High 
forests are used for timber extraction and firewood forests for firewood. Brushwood forests 
are used for grazing of goats and extraction of sticks to vineyards and such.   
 
Pobreg has high forests situated a couple of hours by foot away from the village. The forests 
close to the village are defined as brush-wood forests and are not older than 5 years. These 
forests need protection, but the grazing and oak leave extraction for feed does not harm them.  
 
3.3.1 Timber Products  
 
10 of the 18 informants who answered to the survey questions wanted more timber products 
(chart 4), and 12 of 18 wanted more fire-wood (chart 5). Lack of infrastructure as well as the 
distance is the most important reasons to why they did not extract more. One person referred 
to market access as a problem.  
 
Pobreg’s forests are common pool resources, although there are indications that they exhibit 
open access characteristics. One of the participants in a focus group meeting said that the 
problem with the forests was that they belong to no one. He was then asked: Do you mean no 
one or everyone? He confirmed that he meant no one, and the others shook their heads in 
agreement. Still, there are a number of formal and informal rules hindering the villagers and 
others from extraction.  On the other hand, no informant mentioned rules as a hinder to timber 
or firewood extraction.  
 
A woman aged 85 (2008-06-23) said that even though infrastructure was badly needed and 
was stopping her from using more wooden products, as she wished, she saw positive effects 
of the bad infrastructure.  She meant that with better infrastructure, the forests would be cut 
down immediately and that the forests were protected by the bad infrastructure. A man of 48 
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interviewed two days later expressed the same opinion and said: “The forest is good only 
because there is no infra-structure”.  
 
During a focus group meeting in Kukës on July 2 the participants were asked to comment on 
this statement. They all agreed with the villagers and told that a private company had shown 
interest in investing in infrastructure for these mountainous forests. The municipality had 
decided to deny them the investment possibility. One participant pointed out to the others that 
poverty and underuse is better than total degradation of the forests. They agreed that this 
would be the result of better infrastructure.  
 
Scarcity was not commonly referred to as a hinder to extracting these resources. During an 
interview with forest technician Ilmi Gjana this was confirmed; the forests would need to be 
harvested and replanted. The lack of infrastructure makes the transportation of harvested 
timber very hard.  
 
 
Chart 4. First and second most important constraint to timber extraction. The total  
number of respondents was 18 of which 10 wanted more timber.    
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Chart 5. First and second most important constraint to firewood extraction. The total  
number of respondents was 18 of which 12 wanted more firewood.    
 
3.3.2 Non-timber Products  
 
The two kinds of non-timber forestry products that respondents were asked to relate to were 
medicinal herbs and berries/ fruits.  
 
Sage is the most commonly harvested medical herb. The price for sage is approximately 1 
Euro per kg if they are not cleaned and Euro 1.50 if they are clean. The market is almost 
stochastic, and farmers have no possibility in choosing when to enter. Villagers are contacted 
by a middle-man and offered a price for harvesting a certain amount of a certain kind of herb. 
Villagers do not know before-hand when the person will ask for it. Storing capacities are low 
and herbs are usually dried on the ground in the garden, sometimes sharing the area where 
poultry live (own observation).  Primarily women and children do this work with the help of 
donkeys (Isuf Omari).  
 
17 of the 18 respondents wanted more medicinal herbs. The constraints (see chart 6) have 
been slightly modified for this presentation, and any answers such as “it hasn’t rained” or “the 
components of the nature” have been presented as natural scarcity. The answer “scarcity/ 
overuse” was in some cases accompanied by comments that people had taken too much, that 
investments are not made properly or that everything close to the village is already extracted.  
 
The focus group (July 2) talked about this and meant that the lack of investments, combined 
with bad timing and way of harvesting makes today’s use highly unsustainable. One “bad” 
harvesting way is that the herbs are taken with bare hands and so roots often fall off. The bad 
timing referred to is that herbs are often harvested during the wrong time of the year. One 
might assume that the reason to this is how the market works.  
 
 
Chart 6. First and second most important constraint to medicinal herb extraction. The 
 total number of respondents was 18 of which 17 wanted more medicinal herbs.    
 
Of the six people who wanted more fruits and berries, four referred to the distance as the 
primary constraint. Two said natural constraints (little rain) and scarcity/ overuse. One 
mentioned market access.  
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3.4 Pastures   
 
3.4.1 Albanian Pastures  
 
Overgrazing has become a major problem for Albanian pastures. Shundi (FAP homepage 1) 
concludes that the stocking rate is about 20% higher than the carrying capacity if only sheep 
are considered, 87 % higher if both sheep and goats are included and 310% higher if sheep, 
goats and cattle are included in the calculations. The stocking rate is not evenly distributed 
and it seems that winter pastures are overgrazed while summer pastures are undergrazed. 
(ibid).  
 
The dry matter production on most pastures is less than 600 kg/ hectare on average (Shundi), 
which is very low. Poor natural pastures in Sweden may produce 1500 kg per hectare 
(TAURUS homepage 1) and never less than 800 (Eva Spörndly, personal communication 5 
August 2008). The winter pastures in Pobreg produce less than 400 kilograms per hectare and 
year (own estimations based on the management plan).      
  
An interview on June 9, 2008 with professor Tobako, head of the Forestry Department at the 
Agricultural University and director of Department for Forest Policies, revealed that pastures 
are seen as a problem at the academy. He strongly emphasized the need for more 
reforestations, and gave the primary reason that forests had higher bio-diversity. The author 
talked about how pastures in Sweden are preserved because they have a great variety of 
species. Tobako responded that Albanian pastures are much too overgrazed to habituate rare 
species. This was confirmed by Carl Fredrik von Essen (personal communication 13 July 
2008).  
 
A major problem in the Albanian traditional herding system are the natural gaps in grass 
growth including a longer one during the hot, dry summer and a shorter one during winter. 
The longer summer gap was traditionally solved through the migration of animals to summer 
pastures. Summer pastures are here defined as mountain pastures located so far away from the 
village that it is not possible to walk there and back with the animals over one day. The habit 
of summer pasturing has declined since 1990.  Shundi reports that the reasons to this are 
emigration to urban areas, unwillingness to move with the animals and difficulties in 
organizing the great number of small owners to coordinate summer pasture herding (Shundi, 
FAO homepage 1).  Kume et al simply concludes that the families having too few heads do 
not move animals. By 1998, overgrazing was acknowledged as a major problem for some 
pastures, although summer pastures were improving due to decreased grazing (State of the 
Environment Report 1997-1998).  
 
3.4.2 Why Grazing Matters  
 
Rotational grazing is when one section is left to rest and hence re-grow while animals are 
allowed to graze somewhere else. The traditional use of summer and winter pastures can be 
seen as a rotational grazing system, where some pastures are left to re-grow for several 
months while the others are grazed.  
 
Pastures should not be overgrazed. Amaral-Philips and Hendricks recommends never 
overgrazing a pasture, since it takes longer for an overgrazed plot to recover than it does for 
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one that is optimally grazed (Amaral-Philips and Hendricks). See figure 2 for illustrations of 
grass length and root systems.  
 
 
Figure 2. This figure shows how grazing effects the root system of growing grass. The heavier grazed grass 
is, the smaller the roots are. Source:http://www.managingwholes.com/overgrazing.htm 
 
Also undergrazing leads to lower production than optimal grazing does. This is because some 
species may grow faster and better than others when the land is not grazed, and these are not 
necessarily desirable plants from the animal growth and production perspective. Too high 
grass is easily destroyed (Eva Spröndly, personal communication). 
 
3.4.3 Pastures in Pobreg  
 
Both winter and summer pastures were observed in Pobreg at several occasions with forest 
engineer Fabjola Begaj (see figure 3 to 6 for illustrations of the pastures). She stated that the 
winter pastures were overgrazed. The winter pastures are, according to her, heavily overused. 
Being used all year around, they have no chance to recover (Fabjola Begaj, June and July 
2008). The winter pastures have traditionally been used for grazing during spring and fall and 
in rainy summers, they were also used as meadows. The hay yield depended on the rainfall 
but one or two harvests were common.  
 
Everyone present at the focus group meeting was concerned about the pastures close to the 
village, primarily because of the erosion problems (see figure 4 and 6 for illustrations). 
Erosion is primarily a problem in the spring, when storm water floods down the mountain 
sides. When Ferhat Hallaci, member of the forest association, was asked about these problems 
he did not link the erosion problems with high animal pressure. Carl Fredrik von Essen, the 
World Bank Tirana and Fabjola Begaj, stated that erosion is highly correlated with too high 
animal pressure (4 July 2008 and 30 June, 2008).  
 
The summer pastures have more grass in summer (see figure 3 and 5). The focus group (July 
2008) defined them as abundant. The summer pastures were described as very good and one 
of the present told that they had been proposed by the government to become a protected area 
because they were in such good shape.  
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Figure 3 and 4. Summer pastures bordering the forest (left) and winter pastures (right) with the 
unproductive land due to sulfur dioxide pollution to the right. July 2008. Photos: Private.   
Figure 5 and 6. Close-up of vegetation on summer (to the left) and winter (to the right) pastures. Note that 
these pictures may not be representative. July 2008. Photos: Private  
 
Respondents were asked to tell which land tenure they would prefer for the future 
management of pastures. Eleven respondents said that they wanted the pastures to be privately 
used in the future and four that they wanted them to remain in common use. (Private was 
defined by the interpreter as private user rights, not entitles.) One woman said that she 
believed that management would be better if they were private, but that this would result in an 
unfair distribution of resources. She assumed that she would get less than others, since she 
had very few animals. “I would take better care of it if it was my own, but then I would have 
so little” (Survey interview June 24 2008). Three respondents wished to change the use of the 
pastures to grow crops or plant fruit trees and the others wanted them to remain pastures.   
 
3.5 Agents Influencing Natural Resource Use  
 
There are a number of agents that influence how natural resources are used in the village of 
Pobreg (see figure 7 for an overview). This section identifies these agents. They are presented 
in the thesis since villagers claimed that they were important and influenced natural resource 
management and use. 
 
Albania is a democracy and the parliament legislates. Recently, decentralization in forestry 
and pasture administration has put much of the actual decision-making at district level. The 
local government enforces laws through the forest police, who are armed and who’s primary 
tasks is to protect the forests from illegal logging.  
 
The market for extractable goods such as timber, fire-wood and herbs is regulated by the 
national law and enforced by the forest police. Villagers have legal right to extract fire-wood 
for domestic needs, and to extract non-timber products for selling. They have no right to 
extract timber for market transactions. Traditionally, also the council of elderly have had this 
role of protecting the natural resources.  
 
The NRDP project is financed by the World Bank, Sida, GEF and GoA. Its goal is to reduce 
poverty, ensure sustainable use of natural resources and improve common pastures and 
forests. These three agents set the overall objectives, but villagers are, through the forest 
association, allowed to express the village’s needs. The forest association in Pobreg is 
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constituted by a number of men and one woman who, assisted by a consultant financed under 
NRDP, formulate the FPMP for the development of the natural resources. They get help from 
state-employed engineers in planning constructions such as water reservoirs and micro-
catchments. SNV teaches the NRDP trainers how to deal with for example forest fires or 
illegal logging. They also conduct surveys to investigate for example market potentials and 
economic development.  
 
The council of elders is traditionally, and still, responsible for order and rule obedience in the 
village. The council of the elderly was very important in establishing the village borders in 
cooperation with neighbouring villages’ councils. They also provide social transfers within 
the village. Last winter, the ten poorest families were given free alfalfa from the rest of the 
village for their animals to support the winter. Even though the matter of sustainable use of 
common natural resources traditionally lies within the responsibility of the council of elderly, 
they do not always intervene. They know that the families performing illegal logging are poor 
and need the money far more than the forests need protection (Hallaci and his brother, 
member of the village council).  
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Figure 7. Schematic view over relevant agents for natural resource use.   
 
3.6 Incentives for Pasture Use  
 
The main incentive to graze on winter pastures is that it is easy to combine with other farm 
activities, since these pastures are located close to the village. Cows will walk back to the 
house when they need to drink. The main incentive to use the summer pasture is that it 
involves substantial yield increases, when animals are given the same amount of maize as 
they are in the village.  
 
According to the interviews, farmers are well aware that the pastures close to the village are 
overused and that bringing animals to the summer pastures would improve productivity. It is 
still widely known that most animals do not graze in the mountains. Several informants 
expressed that they missed the times when the animals grazed in the mountains.  
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When asked why they do not use them, farmers continuously answered that it is not possible 
to do so with the few animals they keep today. No informant gave a different reason. Some 
informants also added that they did not have the hut to live in, and that infrastructure was poor 
which makes the transportation of feed and milk time-consuming.  
 
The topic was brought up during both focus group meetings. One of the participants in the 
first focus group said: “Most farmers have only a few animals and it is too far to bring them 
all the way up to the good grazing. The pastures in the forests are summer pastures, and 
someone has to move there to look after the animals. With only a few heads the cost is just 
too high. The distance is large and infrastructure insufficient.” The others agreed and 
concluded that farmers would benefit if they could find ways to use these resources.  
 
The second focus group resulted in similar answers. The participants claimed that it was 
primarily the small agricultural units that hindered people. They all agreed that summer 
pastures would be more used if these units were larger. They all recalled how summer 
pastures had been more used in their childhood (during and before communism). Moreover, 
they saw the need of investments for the summer pastures and concluded that one single 
farmer could not perform such investments by him- or herself. The investments they were 
talking of were housing for herdsmen, fencing for animals and possibly also improved 
drinking facilities for the animals. These are all things that have been there in the past but that 
were destroyed after democratization (Focus group meeting, Kruma, 6 July 2008).  
 
Farmers and local officials were asked how many cows that would be needed to make 
investments in the summer pastures profitable, or “worth it”. All answers ranged between 8 
and 12 cows.  
 
3.7 Outcome  
 
The majority of the animals are not brought to the summer pastures. There are, according to a 
key informant (widow, 49, 8 of July 2008), three types of households that do use the summer 
pastures. The first kind is households that still have a cottage in the mountains. They 
frequently bring others’ animals too.  
 
The other two types allow for someone else to herd the animals. Families that have cottages 
charge 1000 leke (8.21 Euro August 29) to herd a normal household’s animals (for example 
one cow and a few sheep or goats). The charge differs a little depending on kinship and the 
number of heads. The first household type that uses this service is that with relatively slack 
budgetary constraints. They can afford to pay the charge for their animals to produce more 
milk and to support the hard winter.  
 
The other kind of household that use the service is very poor, and they let their animals graze 
in the mountains and pay their shepherd with all the milk produce of their animals for the time 
they spend in the mountains. The reason to this is that they know that by letting their animals 
graze well and grow fatter, they are more likely to support the harsh winter and to get in heat. 
The calves are born during spring in Pobreg, and that these families hence sacrifice the top 
lactation production as payment.  
 
The whole community has to pay for the overuse of summer pastures. Several farmers 
reported to sell nothing but to buy hay on the local (and Kosovan) market since the pastures 
do not serve as meadows any longer.   
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 4 Literature Review  
 
4.1 Property Rights and Natural Resource Use  
 
Four types of property rights are interesting when analysing Pobreg’s natural resources. They 
are state, individual, common and open access property rights. State rights refer to when the 
state has the right to extraction and performs decision-making over a resource. The state may 
or may not give some rights (for example the right to extract certain goods) to the local 
population. Individual or private rights give one individual the right of decision, use and 
extraction. Common property represents private property for a group – people not belonging 
to the group are excluded from as use and decision-making. Open-access is when there is no 
authority over a resource, and access is free to anyone. There are situations where property is 
de facto open access, because the righteous holder of rights has lost control over access 
(Bromley 1990). These rights are important for analyzing Pobreg, especially since pastures 
there have characteristics of several property rights.  
 
As in Ostrom’s article (1999) forests and pastures are here defined as common pool resources. 
Common pool resources are characterized by difficulties of excluding others from using it, 
but with strong competition in the consumption of the resource. They are thus rivalrous in 
consumption but excludable only at a high cost. They may or may not generate public goods 
such as biodiversity. Pastures are, like fish and some other natural resources, stock resources. 
Sustainable resource management implies that there is a continuum of optimal harvesting 
levels, which depend on how future and present consumption are weighted. If the harvest 
exceeds growth sufficiently enough, the resource is degraded irreversible or reversible 
(Ostrom 1999). Pobreg’s forests may also exhibit some open access characteristics.  
 
The famous article “The Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968) has been very influential 
when analyzing common resources. Hardin’s main conclusion is that common resources risk 
overuse because the individual economic agent receives all positive effects of increasing the 
use, while negative effects are shared with everyone using it. The resource will degrade unless 
access is restricted in one way or another, or, to put it in Hardin’s own words, “Freedom in a 
common brings ruin to all”. The problem can be limited if access is no longer made open to 
everyone.  Allocation by wealth, privatization, auctioning, lottery or first-come, first served 
basis are practical ways to solve the problem (Hardin 1968).  
 
One of Hardin’s examples is pastures, where sustainable use of resources is granted only as 
long as the carrying capacity of the resource exceeds the stocking rate. Population growth 
eventually brings stocking rate above carrying capacity, because each herdsman maximizes 
his own utility. The result is erosion and weed-dominance on the pastures and rangelands 
(ibid).  
 
As mentioned above, allocation of resources can rescue the commons and ensure sustainable 
use (ibid). Empirical evidence has shown that there are ways to ensure that resources are not 
overused – common property regimes. Feeny et al (1990) provides a good review of this 
literature. Ostrom (1999) points out a number of attributes under which self-organizing of 
protecting natural resources is feasible. In short, the resource should not be in a state beyond 
saving, but in need of protection. It should also be somehow predictable – outcome should be 
able to trace back to actions and information and knowledge should be available at reasonable 
costs. The users should trust each other and share a common understanding and have similar 
economic interests. They should also have at least minimal skills of organization and have 
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some level of autonomy so that they are not ruled out by authorities. They should depend on 
the resource and hence value it and their personal discount rate should be sufficiently low.  
 
The tragedy of the anti-commons shortly says that common recourses risk getting underused 
when economic agents lack possibilities of excluding others (Heller 1998). The initial article 
on this tragedy described the case of Moscow grocery stores. Kiosks emerged, while the 
grocery stores were left abandoned. No less than 6 categories had the right to sell the stores, 3 
had the right to lease it, 5 had rights to receive revenues from leases, 3 had rights to determine 
use and yet another category had the right to occupy them. This led to the conclusion that 
many parties need to agree for one storefront to be used. If they, for some reason, fail to agree 
or find the cost of agreeing higher than the value, the resource will be left unused. This results 
in underused resources.  
 
4.2 Utility Maximization   
 
Neoclassical economic theory is based on that agent maximize utility under constraints. Such 
constraints may be hard or soft, and limit the choices agents can make. Transaction and 
adjustment costs are assumed to be zero (De Elassi 1983). The fact that true transaction costs 
exists (Coase 1937; Calabresi 1968) has targeted criticism to pure neo-classical concepts. 
Coase (1992) wrote that “a large part of what we think of as economic theory is designed to 
accomplish what high transaction costs would otherwise prevent”. Foss and Foss (2005) 
stresses that the value that a resource may generate to its owner(s) is constrained by the 
transaction costs involved in realizing and controlling the value.  
 
Transaction costs have been used to explain the existence of industrial clusters, which have 
some similarities with the focus of this thesis. Just like is done here, the industrial cluster 
theory claims that location does matter. Industries organizing in clusters may economize on 
transaction costs such as costs related to information exchanges (McPann 2002).   
 
4.3 Pasture Use in the Literature  
 
There are some experiences of how agricultural development affects use of summer pastures. 
Experiences of declined summer pasture (and pasture in general) use exists in different parts 
of the world. Dahlström (2006) stated that only one to two percent of the pastures used in her 
study sites in southern and central Sweden between 1620 and 1950 are grazed today. 
Cooperative pastoral systems have decreased in Europe, and the do not offer the best 
potentials for agricultural use due to climate and topography (Gueydon and Hoffman 2006).  
 
Some similarities with the Pobreg case were found with German collective alp pastures 
investigated by Gueydon and Hoffman (2006). Collective alps were used by lowland farmers 
organized in groups at each alpine pasture. As in Pobreg, the permanent mountain pastures 
were used mainly for fodder, although they also generated values such as habitat for endemic 
species and recreational and cultural values. Another similarity was that the alpine pastures 
were not overused but instead ranged from underused (with problematic growth of bushes) to 
well grazed.  
 
Also similar with the Pobreg situation is that the right to use these pastures were limited to a 
certain group of people, the community. A major difference is that the group of people with 
rights to use the pastures have declined as the fraction of farmers in the total population has. 
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In Pobreg, the number of people depending on livestock production has rather increased as 
off-farm activities have become scarcer.  
 
Shepherds played an important role in the German grazing system, and the farmers 
themselves only herded their animals in one of organization. Rights and shares in the 
organization varied between organizations. Animals, livestock units, per capita and no 
individual but only collective shares were the most common. Only four of twenty-five 
pastures were unprofitable.  
 
Merns (1996) report similar post-communist tendencies as in Pobreg for Kirghizstan. 
Livestock was kept as a part of a diversified agricultural production, possible combined with 
off farm activities. This made the population “part-time herders”. The incentive or possibility 
of bringing animals to the summer pastures is small for such part-time herders, why farmers 
tend to prefer using pastures closer to the village.   
 
Remote summer pastures are thus underused on the expense of overused spring/autumn 
pastures. This was regarded as “perhaps the most serious issue facing Kirghizstan’s common 
pastures at present”. The lack of supplementary fodder was also seen as an important reason 
to the overuse.  
 
He stipulated the reasons to this as: “The main reason for this underuse of available high 
quality, high altitude summer pasture land is the shortage of working capital for the purchase 
of fuel with which to move herding families to the summer pastures, and to provide them with 
a limited range of support services while they are there” (ibid). 
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5 Model and Data  
 
The choice of what pastures to use is an economic problem. This chapter aims to model the 
problem and assign data to it.  
 
5.1 Model  
 
5.1.1 Choice of model  
 
To model the production choices in Pobreg adequately, stylized facts of economy typologies 
were studied. Figure 8 presents different kinds of farm household models. Holden (2004) 
points out that while real world villages usually fall within the quadrant, the extreme cases in 
the corners are rarer. The transaction costs in the figure most often describe costs related to 
accessing external markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Farm household economies. Source: Holden 2004 
 
Figure 9 shows which models that are appropriate in which case. Non-separable models (i.e 
where consumption choices are not separable from consumption choices) are recommended 
where transactions costs are sufficiently high for the household to prefer producing what they 
want to consume regardless of market prices (Holden 2004). High differentiation requires 
models that allow agents to act differently (CGE models).  
 
                                             Differentiation  
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Figure 9. Suitable models for different kind of economies. Source: Holden 2004 
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Households in Pobreg are not specialized in any production, nor do they sell much on the 
market. They do buy hay on the local or Kosovan markets when the produce is not enough to 
cover the needs, and their wheat production is rarely sufficient for providing them with flour 
throughout the whole year. Market access is strictly limited in Pobreg, although non-existing 
farm output surplus might be an equal important variable to explain why so little is sold on 
the market. All farms are relatively small in Pobreg, and there are no large farms that 
specialize in any particular production.  
 
Non-separability strictly means that the market price differs from the shadow value that a 
good produced in the family brings to the producer. “Household production and consumption 
decisions are non-separable whenever the household shadow price of at least one production-
consumption good is not given exogenously by the market but instead is determined 
endogenously by the interaction between household demand and supply” (Löfgren 1999).  
 
Since this is true for Pobreg, a non-separable household model has been assumed to bet fit the 
production in Pobreg. It is important to emphasize that a village economy may change over 
time because of economic development and/ or policy interventions and demographic 
changes. While Pobreg’s production in large is non-separable since the farmers sell little or 
nothing, it has separable characteristics because the farmers buy agricultural inputs and 
outputs on the market.  
 
A shortcoming of the traditional farm household model is that risk attitude is not included. 
For this reason, empirical results based on the below type of model have often not been 
significant. Potential risk aversion is not included in this model, due to lack of data in the 
village and in the country.  
 
The simplest version of the household model is presented in equation (1) to (3). Utility is 
derived from goods consumed, subject to the production constraint, which says that the same 
resources are allocated to produce the two goods. The household decision is based only on the 
utility the goods provide, and takes no account of market prices. Thus, it is non-separable as 
equation (3) shows.  
  
    (1) 
    (2) 
   (3) 
 
Where  represent consumption goods  
 
5.1.2 Production Choices and Natural Resources  
 
Figure 10 presents a schematic view over what influences the natural resource (such as 
pastures) use in Pobreg. Natural resource in (t+1) is affected by random effects that are 
exogenous to the model (i.e. rainfall) and by the choices made in the previous period. These 
choices, the choices of agricultural and natural resource management, depend on several 
things. Exogenous economic institutions and household assets are important determinants.  
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Figure 10. Schematic picture of links between households assets, farming practises and natural resource 
outcome. Developed from Swinton (2003) 
 
Farmers maximize utility, which is derived from consumption of goods. The household is 
indifferent between consuming bought and consuming own produced goods.  
 
5.1.3 Model  
 
The link between livestock production and crops is corn. Wheat production is not necessarily 
conducted, and wheat is never given to animals as fodder. Even though wheat – when grown 
– contributes to the family’s utility, wheat along with vegetables, grapes and other agricultural 
output are left out of further modelling to instead focus on livestock production.  
 
Corn is an output from the crop production and an important input to livestock production. 
Hay (purchased, from the arable land and from the permanent pastures/ meadows) and alfalfa 
from other arable land are additional sources of energy. An important constraint to production 
is water (rainfall), affecting grass/ corn and animal growth/ milk produce.  
A further simplification is that animal kind is not accounted for. Instead, we calculate animals 
as livestock units based on their weight.  
 
Utility from livestock is maximized through two consumption products, milk and meat as in 
equation six. Meat and milk products are a function of breed (B), feed (simplified to energy, 
E) and water (W). Since production estimated are known only for cow milk yields, the below 
model is simplified to this product only.  
 
      (4)  
 
     (5) 
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Energy is given to the livestock through the feed and the grazing. The milk yield to be 
expected is derived from the simple expression in equation 6, given a certain breed and water 
level (Spröndly  .  
 
  
      (6) 
 
The production function of both meat and milk should include responses to diet and water and 
be dependant also on breed. The dietary choices are of particular interest to find out the 
conditions under which summer pastures should be in use. Feed may be constituted of hay, 
grazing, maize or alfalfa (equation 7).  
 
   (7) 
 
    
     
     
     
      
                   
 
The consumption and production of alfalfa, hay and maize are limited by land, technology, 
water and budget. The household’s income is allocated to agricultural inputs, outputs and 
other goods so that utility is maximized.   
 
Grazing activities can be allocated to winter pastures (g1) and summer pastures (g2). The total 
energy derived from the pastures is the sum of the grazing on both pastures (equation 8).  
 
       (8) 
 
Grazing is constrained for both pastures. The sum of grazing from all livestock in the village 
cannot exceed the total quantity of grass, which is a function of the land and how it is 
managed (equation 9 and 10).  
 
     (9)
   
     (10) 
 
The economic problem the agents face is to chose grassing activities to maximize utility. A 
profit maximizing model is assumed to fit this problem, since there are some costs involved in 
the problem. This problem is not, like previously stated, non-separable from market prices. 
Farmers buy hay on the market, and taking a loan to invest in housing for summer pastures 
definitely involves the market.  
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Arable land production is limited by land and other constraints. It is assumed that farmers 
give their livestock as much of agricultural output-based feed as they can, why we allow the 
economic problem to be limited to only summer and winter pastures. Potential substitution 
between grazing and other feed (such as maize) are not expressed in this model.  
 
The utility function earlier presented has been transformed to a profit function. This is a 
simplification that is reasonable given that there is no information about what utility the 
population may derive from activities and goods. ( ) is the shadow value of milk. FC (fixed 
costs) and variable costs (VC) are different for summer and winter pastures. We assume that 
farmers maximize profit when they decide what pastures to use. This is probably not fully 
true, since they normally do not sell milk.  
 
The profit function for winter pastures simply consists of revenues (milk yield multiplied by 
its value) the labor cost of herding animals, and the cost of degrading pastures by overuse 
(equation 12). This differs from the profit function for summer pastures, where there are also 
costs relating to the investment and transaction costs (equation 13).  
 
The shadow value of grazing is assumed to equal the shadow value of hay, which is assumed 
to be the market price. The cost of grazing on pastures is the negative impact grazing has 
shared with all other users (n) and labor costs.  
 
    (11) 
 
 (12) 
 
   (13) 
 
Section 5.3 presents estimated results of the profit functions. These results show how many 
animals that are needed for a family to make the necessary investments for using summer 
pastures.  
   
5.2 Data  
 
Empirical evidence on production estimates, grazing effects and nutritional values of pastures 
was scarce at the site, and a number of assumptions have been made to fill the model with 
data.  
 
4.2.1 Livestock Production Estimates  
 
Dairy cows. There is little information to be found about how cows are affected by restricted 
diets because such research is considered unethical in the Western countries and is hard to 
carry through in less developed countries (Sigrid Agenäs, personal communication 30 July 
2008).  
 
One article where cows with restricted diets were given more feed was found (FAO 
homepage 2). The effect of increasing the concentrate feed to dairy cows has been made by 
the FAO, where it was found that the additional energy in the beginning of the lactation cycle 
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had a major influence over milking performance throughout the whole lactation period. The 
upper line in figure 12 represents the milk yields of cows given additional eight kilograms of 
concentrate in the first quarter of the lactation, the middle the yield of those given an extra 
four kg throughout the first half of the lactation curve and the third the yield of those given 
additionally two kilograms of concentrate throughout the whole lactation curve. Actually, by 
allocating most feed to the early lactation 611 kg of extra milk per cow could be extracted 
over the full lactation curve. (FAO homepage, 2).  
 
This would indicate that it is important for the whole lactation process that cows are given 
sufficient energy in the early phases of the lactation curve.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Milk yield response to inproved nutrition. Source: 
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/ARTICLE/AGRIPPA/X9500E09.HTM 
 
The top yield for cows kept in the village throughout the whole year is 8 kg per day (personal 
information, villagers and Hallaci), the total milk yield for the lactation curve is 1025 kg (the 
management plan FPMP??) and the lactation curve is 42 weeks (Naim Pacara). The change at 
the top of the lactation curve is from 8 to 15 kilograms when cows are brought to the summer 
pastures. Cows normally fawn in April, and it is assumed that they would be brought after 
approximately 2 weeks.  
 
Assuming that Pobreg lactation curves exhibit similar curvature as the cows in the FAO 
article,, the following lactation curves have been estimated.  
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Figure 13. Estimated daily milk yeilds throughout the lactational curve.  
 
 
Figure 14. Estimated weekly milk yields throughout the lactational curve.  
 
The producer price for milk was 35 leke (0.29 Euro, 29 August 2008) per kilogram in 2005 
(FAO statistics homepage). These estimates should be used with caution, since most 
households in Pobreg sell nothing of their produce to the market. It might be argued to be an 
over-estimate, since farmers would never buy milk at the market for this price. On the other 
hand, the households in Pobreg are very poor and using the price could also be seen as an 
under-estimate. The true value of getting out of starvation and malnutrition can be argued to 
be higher.  
 
Another way of calculating the true value of milk is to compare the content with other foods 
that are de facto bought on the market. Even though milk contains a number of other 
nutrients, it is reasonable to assume that poor people optimize energy and that other macro-
nutrients and micronutrients are added to the diet as the budget constraint is relaxed.  
 
The assumed energy content of the consumption milk produced is 640 kilocalories per 
kilogram (USDA homepage 1) and the value of the flour bought on the market is assumed to 
  33 
 
 
be 3660 kilocalories per kilogram (USDA homepage 2). That means that one additional 
kilogram of milk can replace approximately 175 grams of flour. These values have been 
assumed to reflect the nutritional values of Pobreg products. The local price for flour is 
estimated to 47 leke (0.39 Euro 29 August 2008) per kilogram (statistics provided by von 
Essen). The shadow value of the energy in one kilogram of milk is hence 8.25 leke (0.06 euro, 
29 August 2008).   
 
Dairy sheep and goats. The impact of better pastures should be positive also on sheep and 
goats, but it should be less because of the following reasons:  
1.  Sheep and goats are normally at the end of their lactation curve, implicating that the 
possibility of increase is smaller 
2. Sheep and goats are fit for grazing on marginal lands, so that they are able to use 
poorer (winter) pastures better. 
 
One possible improvement of sheep and goat dairy animals is that they are likely to grow 
fatter, improving the possibility to get in heat.  
 
Meat cattle. According to the results Naim Pacara (personal communication, August 2008) 
got from the field research some twenty years ago all meat animals were affected positively 
by the change to summer pastures. Unfortunately, these results have not been saved and 
Pacara could not tell exactly what the difference was. Inger Ledin, professor at the department 
for animal husbandry, Swedish University of Agricultural Science, thinks that growth cannot, 
at least, decrease (personal communication, 28 July 2008).     
 
5.2.2 Recovery of Winter Pastures 
 
The winter pastures generate 340-380 kilograms of grass yearly and hectare (Therthore 
management plan), so that the total area of winter pastures generate 60 000 kilograms of hay 
yearly. This does not, unfortunately, tell us much about what the yield would be if the 
pastures recovered. The average yield on Albanian pastures is 600 kilograms per hectare and 
year, and we assume that is the top yield for this pasture also.  
 
Local forest engineer Ilmi Gjana was asked to make assumptions on how the pastures would 
re-grow if they were left alone for six months. He was asked because of his knowledge of the 
local habitats as well as long training and experience of field work.  He was not able to 
provide any numbers, but confirmed that reduced pressure on winter pressure during the 
summer months would greatly help their recovery and decrease erosion. Carl Fredrik Von 
Essen (personal communication 27 August 2008) estimates that normally overused pastures 
may need five years to recover. Carl Fredrik von Essen estimates that normally overused 
pastures in Albania may need five years to recover.  
 
Eva Spörndly, researcher, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, looked at the photos 
brought by the author and concluded that biological tests would be needed to certify what 
would be needed for the pastures to recover. Her main advice was that animals should be 
taken away from relatively early in the spring for the pastures to recover. Today, farmers 
allow their animals to graze there whenever there is something eatable around, and this makes 
it difficult for the herbs and grasses to grow strong enough to re-grow. Instead, they should be 
left for about six months.  
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With no other estimates available, it is assumed that the average Albanian pasture yield (600 
kilogram per hectare and year) would be obtained in 5 years if summer pastures were allowed 
to rest during six months yearly. It is assumed that the re-growth function would be S-shaped.   
 
5.2.4 Costs associated with Using Summer Pastures  
 
The costs of using summer pastures include: transport to and from the pasture, transport of 
products, cost of hut, and cost of work  
 
It takes one and a half hour to walk to or from the summer pastures on the steep and stony 
road (own experience). With animals, the time requirement is seven or eight hours (widow, 
49, 8 of July 2008). This makes it impossible to herd animals without a place to live in the 
mountains.  
 
An option to facilitate the use of summer pastures would be to substantially improve 
infrastructure. This topic has been discussed in the village and in the municipality, and as 
mentioned earlier it would facilitate timber extraction. Since the commune has chosen not to 
allow a private company to build a new road because of the risk of illegal logging and 
environmental degradation, the impact of improved infrastructure is left out of this reasoning.    
 
Pack animals would be needed to transport feed and milk products from the summer pastures 
to the village. They would have to be brought out of other production, or bought separately, to 
serve in the summer pastures.  
A donkey must be used on the summer pastures to transport produce and corn to and from the 
village. Donkeys graze on poor lands, and too nutritionally rich feed may harm them. 
Therefore, they are often allowed to graze after other animals. During the winter months, 
when there is not much to graze on, they should be given three kilograms of hay daily, 
possible combined with some mineral concentrates (Pia Söderström, personal communication 
30 July 2008).  Local livestock specialist Pacara estimates the daily dietary need for the 
donkeys to be 1 or 2 kilograms of hay (personal communication July 29 2008). The local 
retail price for hay in Kukës was 6 leke (0.05 Euro 29 August 2008) per kilogram (Statistics 
MAFCP).   
 
The costs for constructing a mountain hut are estimated to 500-1000 Euro (Ferhat Hallaci, 8 
July 2008) and the technical lifetime up to 20 years (Carl Fredrik von Essen 29 July, 2008). 
The real estate tax for buildings constructed after 1993 is 6 leke per square meter and year 
(Erjon Luci, Economist, World Bank Tirana, 30 July 2008). The estimated need for 
maintenance is 1000 leke (8.21 Euro 29 August 2008) (own estimate). Depending on what 
materials that are used, the roof might need maintenance after ten years. The cost for this is 
estimated to 30 Euro per square meter (von Essen, personal communication 15 July 2008). It 
is believed that the roofs the Pobreg farmers build is less expensive, since the cost of the roof 
would otherwise exceed the total cost of building the cheapest possible house according to 
Hallaci’s estimates. It is estimated that two persons would be required to live in one hut and 
herd one unit of animals. Further, these two persons would need one pack animal to transport 
feed and milk products to and from the village.  
 
Carl Fredrik von Essen (personal communication 28 July 2008) told that the minimum wage 
in Albania is 150 Euro per month. Naim Pacara estimated true the labour costs to be less than 
2000 leke (16.42 Euro 29 August 2008) per month, and Hallaci around 1000 leke (8.21 Euro 
29 August 2008) per month for this kind of work. These lower estimates are probably more 
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correct shadow values of what one person is expected to contribute to the family’s economy 
during one month.  
 
There is no grazing fee for using winter or summer pasture. The only cost that is relevant is 
the cost of decreased pasture quality and yields, which is shared by everyone else using the 
pastures. This cost is very hard to estimate, in part because it is not known how overgrazing 
affects these pastures. Moreover, the discount rate with which future generations’ pasture use 
is discounted.   
 
5.3 Results  
 
The profit functions presented shows the economic problem the farmers are facing. The costs 
are likely to be higher for summer pastures, since investments have to be made. On the other 
hand are expected milk yields higher. This means that there will be some production point 
where it is optimal to reallocate grazing activities to the summer pastures during summer.  
 
 (14) 
 
   (15) 
 
The results are indeed uncertain, since so little is known about actual costs and benefits. 
When the energy shadow value for milk is used, the break-even point between summer and 
winter pastures occurs at five cows (see figure 15), without regards taken to the opportunity 
costs, which are assumed to be substantial. A family might, for example, prefer to invest in 
another cow since this increases yield and is an asset. Sigrid Agenäs (personal 
communication, July 2008) said that her experience is that farmers in poor countries may 
prefer having several cows with low yields instead of a few with the same yield because the 
cow herself is a security. Transaction costs were found to be very hard to quantify, and are 
only captured in the high labor requirement for the mixed summer and winter pasture system. 
It is assumed that two persons need to be engaged in the grazing activities, partly because of 
the distance.  
 
This thesis failed to recognize the value of improved pastures, and this is left out of the profit 
analysis.  
 
Since there we might expect some positive effects on other livestock as well, there will also 
be some mixed livestock production unit where it is optimal to use summer pastures. This size 
is un-known.  
 
 
  36 
 
 
 
Production size, 
cows  5 
Shadow value, 
milk  8,25 Interest rate  0,18 
      
Costs and Revenues for Milk Cow Production on Mixed Summer and Winter 
Pastures (Albanian leke) for the first 4 of 20 years   
Year    1 2 3 4 
Investments -75000     
      
Yearly Costs       
Donkey   72 72 72 72 
Labor   21000 21000 21000 21000 
Maintenance   1000 1000 1000 1000 
Real estate taxes   120 120 120 120 
Annual payment   14011,50 14011,50 14011,50 14011,50 
Opportunity cost 
of capital and labor   
                         
n.a. 
                   
n.a. 
                     
n.a. 
                    
n.a. 
Total costs   36203,49859 36203,49859 36203,49859 36203,49859 
      
Yearly Revenues       
Milk Yield   1922 1922 1922 1922 
Total value, milk  79282,5 79282,5 79282,5 79282,5 
Improved WP   
                          
n.a 
                    
n.a 
                      
n.a 
                     
n.a 
      
Total Revenues  79282,5 79282,5 79282,5 79282,5 
      
Profit   43079,00141 43079,00141 43079,00141 43079,00141 
      
Costs and Revenues for Milking Cows Production on Winter Pastures only  
      
Costs       
Labor   6000 6000 6000 6000 
Decreased quality 
of pastures              
                         
n.a. 
       
n.a. 
                     
n.a. 
                    
n.a. 
      
Revenues       
Milk yield   1025 1025 1025 1025 
Total value, milk   42281,25 42281,25 42281,25 42281,25 
      
Profit   36281,25 36281,25 36281,25 36281,25 
Figure 15. Estimations of total costs and benefits at a production size of five cows. Note that many 
estimates are missing and that other estimates may have poor accuracy in reality. 
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6 Analysis  
 
This chapter aims to return to the research questions asked in the introduction of the thesis 
and analyze these with help from the empirical data as well as the theories presented. The 
questions were:  
 
• What are the reasons for the uneven use of pastures?  
• How many cows are needed for the traditional mixed pasture system to be profitable?  
• Would a policy of moving grazing activities to underused summer pastures from 
overused winter pastures be recommended?  
 
6.1 Reasons to Uneven Use of Pastures  
 
Why is use so uneven? Shouldn’t rational famers reallocate animal production when one 
resource has free capacity and the other is unsustainable overused? Winter pastures are 
overused, despite the fact that there is an alternative. Before being able to recommend any 
remedies, it is crucial to understand the reasons.  
 
5.1.1 Summer Pastures  
 
The interviews with both villagers and local officials revealed that summer pastures have 
been much more used prior to democratization. It was concluded that the underuse of summer 
pastures was indeed caused by the structural change towards smaller family farms after 
democratization.  
 
Villagers reported the reason to why they did not use summer pastures was that they had too 
few animals. This is supported by Kume et al who discussed sheep and goat production in 
mountainous Albania in their article. They wrote “The farmers having very few head do not 
migrate animals.” This is partly in line with what Shundi (FAO webpage 1) wrote: “An 
additional more important reason is the fact that, following the agricultural reform in the early 
nineteen-nineties, that involved the division and privatization of land in the plains used in the 
past as winter pastures, the mountain farmers have difficulties in contacting the numerous 
owners in the lowlands to organize their transhumance.” 
 
Farmers never mentioned financing or credit access as a reason to why summer pastures could 
not be used the way that local officials did. Kristaq Jorghi, USAID told that a single farmer 
could easily qualify for funding for summer housing and that the offered interest rate would 
be 18-23 percent. It is not known if farmers are aware of these opportunities. During the focus 
group with farmers in Hasi, it was made clear that at least the farmers present did not consider 
applying for funding with USaid. They found that the interest rate was much too high.  
 
Farmers might know that even if they stop overusing winter pastures and instead allocate 
grazing to the summer pastures, others will not do so and they will not get any benefits from 
their actions to save the winter pastures. The poorest people would still use the winter 
pastures all year round.  
 
Moscow kiosks and the tragedy of the anti-commons (see section 4) may have some 
similarities with Albanian summer pastures. The land tenure regulations are different for 
different kind of resources and gaps and overlaps exist (World Bank Tirana report). There are 
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also a great number of agents that have rights to decide, use and exclude others from use (see 
figure 7). Going back to what has previously been stated about land tenure security in 
Albania, there are reasons why a rational economic agent may not choose to allocate (scarce) 
economic means to common resources, leaving them underused. When farmers were asked 
what they believed would happen with tenure of pastures in the future, they all said that it was 
impossible to know and that it all comes down to which party that will win the 2009 election. 
There was, however, no informant who mentioned insecure land tenure as a reason not to use 
summer pastures.  
 
Transaction costs exist (Coase 1992). When these are constant or relatively constant, small 
agricultural production units have more difficulties to overcome these. 
 
Merns (1996) found that winter pastures was overused because farmers was part time herders, 
and could not, given the diversity of their production, migrate to higher altitudes during 
summer in Kirghizstan. The main reason was that the possibility and incentive for farmers of 
using the summer pastures was limited by shortages of working capital. This reason is 
probably valid also for Pobreg.   
 
Other possible explanations, that was not brought up by any informant but that should still not 
be left out of the analysis, are changes in demographics and preferences. Other authors (Kume 
et al) has pointed out that migration makes it hard to find shepherds. There was, however, 
nothing in the case study that indicates that this is why people choose not to use summer 
pastures.  
 
6.1.3 Winter Pastures  
 
One possible explanation to the overuse of winter pastures would be to claim that it is an 
example of the tragedy of the commons. This might be true to a certain extent. Farmers 
claimed that they would use pastures different if the resource was theirs’ to use. The focus 
group meetings resulted in similar understandings of the problem.  
 
The focus group meeting in Kukës, where the commons were claimed to belong to “no one” 
indicates that there is some tragedy of the commons involved. This could mean that the 
common property regimes have weakened and that common resources exhibit some open 
access characteristics. The participants held the change to private rights to use as the most 
important thing for the forests and pastures to improve. On the other hand, they claimed that 
poverty was the main reason to overuse, and that the people that used the resources 
unsustainable were the poorest. They claimed that these villagers were well aware that it was 
unsustainable, but that their economic situation left them no choice. Hallaci (personal 
communication June 2008) said that the village and its council often agreed to such use, 
although it is against the rules, because everyone knew very well that the situation of these 
families were very difficult.  
 
The tragedy of the commons is based on the notion that people overuse common resources 
because their private optimal out-take is larger individually than it would be if farmers acted 
jointly. An interview with five men in Hasi district on 28 June 2008 told that there had been 
severe problems with overuse of resources after they had been made private in right to use. 
The five men argued that people might be more likely to overuse private resources. This 
would be because they desperately needed them and when the rules of the community no 
longer stopped them, they would do so.  
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The main interpretation of the results from the interviews is that the overuse should not 
without caution be regarded only as a result of resources being treated as open access. People 
may have high private discount rates because they are poor, regardless of the land tenure 
system.   
 
6.2 What Production Size is needed to Use Summer Pastures?   
 
The very rough profit calculations showed that it is optimal to allocate grazing to summer 
pastures if the household holds five or more cows. However, it is plausible that this estimate 
does not accurately reflect the situation. What can be said is that there exists some production 
unit level when it is optimal to make investments to use the summer pastures. If this is exactly 
four or five cows, more, or even less is not the main point of this reasoning. What is important 
is that the number of livestock does matter, just like the informants claimed. Farmers and 
local officials were asked to estimate how many cows that would be needed to invest in 
housing at summer pasture sights. The answers ranged between eight and ten cows. This is 
higher than what the calculations revealed, which indicates that the calculations are missing 
something.  
 
Opportunity costs were not included in the model, and it is plausible that transaction costs 
were not properly captured either. It is quite plausible that farmers experience these costs as 
quite substantial and therefore need more cows to invest in housing at summer pasture sights.  
 
Risk aversion was not included in the calculations. Attitudes towards risk are probably 
relevant when considering herding animals in open mountain pastures. Informants claimed 
that the risk of predators attacking domestic animals was not much higher in the summer 
pastures. They said that it happened equally often in the lowland of the village. Production at 
summer pastures should also result in a risk reduction, since the risk that livestock do not 
proceed in heat is reduced if their dietary requirements are met, which is more likely to 
happen at summer pastures. But, taking a loan at an interest rate of 18-23 percent does include 
some risk, especially when farmers only hold a few animals. 
 
6.2 Policy Recommendations  
 
Respondents expressed that the primary reason to why summer pastures are not fully used is 
that the agricultural production units are too small. If policy aims at making the grazing at 
winter and summer pastures more even, it should try to solve this problem.  
 
There are two obvious ways to do that; larger individual farms or cooperation between small 
farms. Farms often become first smaller (due to population growth), and then larger (due to 
Cochrane’s treadmill and Engel’s law) as the economy grows. The transformation towards 
larger farms has not started in Pobreg. Off-farm job opportunities are scarce and migration is 
much less common than in other parts of the country. A growing economy should over a 
longer time horizon, result in larger farms with better possibilities of overcoming large 
transaction and fixed costs, something that would facilitate a more sustainable and profitable 
natural resource use.  
 
But, at the time being, this is not the case. So, cooperation is argued here to be the main 
option for policy to target this problem. As discussed previously in the thesis, experiences of 
cooperation exist in post-communist Albania, although it is quite rare. The focus group 
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meetings, where cooperation was discussed, showed that cooperation between farmers is 
regarded as an option although not yet common in the region. They claimed that pilot 
cooperation projects were beneficial, since the villagers was then allowed to see with their 
own eyes that cooperation can work. The literature study showed that a trust-worthy third part 
(coordinator) is important to reduce the fear of being cheated.  
 
The cost for letting shepherds care for one household’s animals is about 1000 Albanian leke 
(8.21 Euro 29 August 2008). This is worth analyzing a little, since it is the exact number that 
Hallaci said the farmers could expect to gain in an average month (i.e. the shadow value of 
labor). Since a mountain shepherd may care for as many as 20 milking cows and additionally 
a herd or sheep and heifers (personal communication, Naim Pacara, August 2008), the cost of 
letting someone else care for the animals is quite high, compared to labor costs.  
 
One explanation to this pricing might be that the entrance barrier of starting grazing activities 
on mountain pastures is high. The entrance barrier is constituted by relatively high fixed costs 
in building the house and possible also by having to move towards more specialized 
production since labor availability will be limited during harvest seasons.  
 
Another explanation may be that contracting is a relatively constant transaction cost. Shundi 
found that one reason that summer pastures are underused in Albania is the difficulties of 
contracting between small lowland farmers and mountain shepherds. This is not fully 
applicable on the Pobreg case, since the mountain shepherds are villagers. Livestock 
producers are small and many which may complicate contracting in Pobreg. Spörndly 
(personal communication, August 2008) emphasizes that the farmers will want to be certain 
that the get their share of the production when allowing someone else to care for the animals. 
The shepherd’s total cost for memorizing/ noting yields and distributing them among 
contracting farmers will rise as the number of contractors does.  
 
Regardless of the reasons to the pricing, farmers found that the cost of having someone else to 
herd the animals was too high. So, can policy solve the problem of underused summer 
pastures and overused winter pastures at a lower cost than the market can?  
 
The interview result showed that farmers commonly cooperative on managing pastures and 
forests, and that they did not do so in financing, banking or market issues. An existing 
cooperation on using summer pasture does exist, which indicates that this is not the initial 
problem.  
 
The profit calculation showed that production on summer pastures may indeed be profitable, 
even if milk is only valued to what it would cost to buy the same energy at a low cost at the 
market. It would be even more so if farmers had access to a market where they could sell their 
products.   
 
Two persons could easily care for 20 milking cows and additionally sheep, heifers or goats 
(Naim Pacara, personal communication August 2008). The average cost per cow and month is 
about 276 leke (2.27 Euro 31 August 2008).  Farmers claimed that they would have to pay the 
mountain shepherds about 1000 leke for one month (personal communications, villagers, July 
2008).   
 
If the estimates are correct, it can be concluded that the policy might include substantial 
welfare gains. However, it is important to remember that in the measure of 276 leke, costs for 
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controlling and distributing milk is not included. Trust between members of cooperation units 
is crucial to keep these costs down.  
 
If a lower discount rate is used to finance the project, the average cost of summer pasture 
production will decrease further. One discount rate that has been used within the NRDP is 12 
percent (Carl Fredrik von Essen, personal communication 2008). With this discount rate, the 
average price per cow would drop to 243 leke per cow and month.  
 
An important reason to why some policy might be needed is the risk of free-riding. If some 
farmers by free will reallocate grazing activities so that the yield on winter pastures increases, 
others may (just like in pollution problems with several countries) find it optimal to stay in the 
village during summer to extract what others left.  
 
There are contemporary policies aiming at improving the winter pastures in Pobreg. 
Introducing policies that move grazing activities from overused winter pastures to underused 
summer pastures should be considered an alternative in these policies. This would result in 
three major social gains. The first is better nutrition through higher milk (and possible other) 
yields. The second is the potential of recovery of winter pastures. At last, summer pastures 
hold the potential, if properly maintained, to preserve rare habitats of species. The loss of bio-
diversity on the Balkan Peninsula has gained attention and protecting these values might turn 
out to be a sound investment.  
 
The interviews with villagers showed that villagers was in general very pleased with the 
presence of the NRDP, and it is hence concluded that the NRDP might very well serve as a 
trust-worthy third part in implementing cooperation over summer pasture herding.  
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7 Conclusions  
 
Farmers claim that it is not optimal to use summer pastures because they are too far away 
given the numbers of animals they hold. They experienced costs exceed the experienced 
benefits at current production unit sizes. Our calculations as well as the interview results 
indicate that this would not be the case had they more animals.  
 
There is no dairy company in Kukës or Hasi, and the demand for processed dairy products in 
the supermarkets is largely met by Macedonian and Greek producers. So, the benefits of 
increasing milk production are likely to be limited to what the household can consume.  
 
Financing is not impossible, but farmers find the interest rate offered by USaid, who is 
present in the area, too high. It ranges between 18 and 23 percent at present (Kristaq Jorgjo). 
Inflation rate was at 2.4 percent in 2006 (EU-business homepage 1). 
 
Larger units, higher tenure security and increased market access (for example the introduction 
of a regional dairy) is argued to have possibilities of changing this situation.  
 
Policy-makers may have additional possibilities of moving grazing activities to summer 
pastures. Von Essen (8 July 2008) tells about how grazing fees is a part of the communal 
grazing system in southern Albania. Farmers could be offered a subsidy for grazing their 
animals on abundant land, or could they be charged for using winter pastures during summer. 
Construction of summer huts and establishments of cooperation units may be another way of 
moving grazing to summer pastures during the summer months.  
 
Moving grazing activities to summer pastures during summer results in two main benefits. 
They are milk yield increases and potentials for winter pastures to recover. An additional 
benefit that this thesis has not focused on is the value of preserving bio-diversity in Balkan 
pastures. This thesis failed in quantifying the benefits in terms of improved winter and 
summer pastures. If milk is rated to its energy shadow value, mixed summer and winter 
pasture grazing would be more profitable than only winter pasture grazing at as few as five 
cows according to the estimates presented earlier. Opportunity costs and transaction costs are 
not properly modelled, why five cows may be an under-estimate. Farmers claimed that it 
would be beneficial to make investments to use summer pastures if they had more than eight 
to twelve cows.  
 
The main finding of this thesis is that policy could move grazing activities to underused 
summer pastures from overused winter pastures. The calculations indicates that average cost 
per cow and month would be 243-276 leke, and sheep and goats could be cared for at the 
same time without any additional cost. If benefits of milk yield increase and improved winter 
pastures are valued higher, it is recommended that this policy is carried through.  
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Woman, 45 years old. 23 June 2008. In her home, Pobreg. 
 
Woman, 20 years old. 23 June 2008. In her home, Pobreg. 
 
Woman, 85 years old. 23 June 2008. In her home, Pobreg  
 
Man, 56 years old. 23 June 2008. In her home, Pobreg  
 
Woman, 37 years old. 24 June 2008. In her home, Pobreg 
 
Man, 45 years old. 24 June 2008. In his home, Pobreg  
 
Woman, 39 years old. 24 June 2008. In her home, Pobreg  
 
Man, 46 years old. 24 June 2008. In his home, Pobreg  
 
Woman, 19 years old. 24 June 2008. In her aunt’s home, Pobreg  
 
Man, 55 years old. 24 June 2008. In his home, Pobreg.  
 
Man, 48 years old. 24 June 2008. In his home, Pobreg.  
 
Man, 47 years old. 24 June 2008. In his home, Pobreg. 
 
Man, 28 years old. 24 June 2008. In his mother’s garden, Pobreg. 
 
Man, 69 years old. 24 June 2008. In his home, Pobreg.  
 
Man, 28 years old. 24 June 2008. On the pastures down-hill from Pobreg.  
 
Man, 69 years old, member of the council of the elderly. 24 June 2008. In his home, Pobreg.  
 
Man, 24 years old. 25 June 2008. Unemployed fire-fighter. Restaurant Gjallica, Kukës.  
 
Man, 50 years old. 25 June 2008. Working with micro-catchment constructions, Pobreg.  
 
Man, 48 years old. 25 June 2008. Working with micro-catchment constructions, Pobreg.  
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Woman, 39, widow. June 18 and July 8 2008.  
 
Woman, 37. July 8 2008.  
 
Man, 46 years old. 25 June 2008. Working with micro-catchment constructions, Pobreg.  
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Gjana, Ilmi. District Forest Service Kukës.   +355683744665 
 
Hallaci, Ferhat, member of the forest council, Pobreg  +355683157471   
 
Hallaci, Sali. Forest Police, District Forest Service Kukës,  +355684012686 
 
Omuri, Isuf. SNV Kukes     +355684012677 
 
Pacara, Naim. Livestock specialist RASP Kukes   +355684072702  
 
Selishta Salim. District Forest Service, Hasi and NRDP trainer  
 
Shuti, Xhelal. Kukës Forestry Department (local government).  
 
Tershalla, Zenel. Kukës Forestry Department (local government).  
28 June 2008.  
 
von Essen, Carl Fredrik. World Bank, Tirana.    +355692035445 
 
Professor Tobako, Headmaster, Agricultural University, Tirana, Faculty of Forestry. 
http://www.ubt.edu.al/aut.htm  
 
Focus Group Meetings:  
 
Five male farmers. 16 June 2008. Hasi district, on the main road.  
 
Five male farmers. 3 July 2008. Brenoge, outside the café.  
 
Group of women, 8 June 2008. Pobreg, in one of the women’s garden.  
 
Focus group with local experts 1. 2 July 2008. SNV office, Kukës.  Participants:  
 
1. Kola, Hilmi. District Forest Service Kukës. 00355684012672 
 
2. Gjana, Ilmi. District Forest Service Kukës. 00355683744665 
  
3. Halili, Vexhi. MADA (Mountain Area Development Agency) Kukes. 
00355682324515 
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4. Pacara, Naim. RASP Kukes 00355684072702 
 
5. Shehu, Isak. NRDP Kukes (Local coordinator) 00355682013046 
 
6. Omuri, Isuf. SNV. 00355684012677 
 
Focus group with local experts, Consultant office, Kruma.Participants: 5 specialists from the 
Has area  
 
 Personal communication on specific topics.  
 
Agenäs, Sigrid. Assistant professor, Swedish University of Agricultural Sceince. Department 
of Animal Husbandry. 018-672146 
 
Begaj, Fabjola. Forest engineer and translator.  +355683026645 
 
Jorgjo, Kristaq. Specialist in Agriculture. USaid Albania. kjorgji@usaid.gov    
 
Ledin, Inger. Professor. Swedish University of Agricultural Sceince. Department of Animal 
Husbandry. 018-671646 
 
Luci, Erjon, Economist. The World Bank Tirana. eluci@worldbank.org 
 
Söderström, Pia. Svenska åsneföreningen. 08-550 945 15 
 
Spörndly, Eva. Researcher. Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences. 018-671632 
 
Stjernesjö, Åsa. ResearcherDepartment of Food Science, Swedish University of Agricultural 
Sciences +46-18-67 20 37  
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